This paper examines the impact of North-South trade-related technology diffusion on TFP growth in small and large states in the South. The main findings are: i) TFP growth increases with North-South trade-related technology diffusion, with education, and with the interaction between the two, and it decreases with the emigration of skilled labor (brain drain); ii) these effects are substantially (over three times) larger in small states than in large ones. Small states also exhibit a much higher brain drain level. Consequently, the brain drain generates greater losses in terms of TFP growth in small states than in large ones for two reasons: the greater sensitivity of TFP growth to the brain drain and the substantially greater brain drain level.
Introduction
An important literature exists on the effects of countries' human capital on their productivity growth, with most studies conducted in a closed-economy context. This paper focuses on the differential impact of the brain drain in small and in large states. It examines the impact of North-South trade as a vehicle of technology diffusion, as well as the impact of human capital, on total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the South.
Specifically, it provides empirical analysis of the impact on TFP growth of i) trade-related technology diffusion, human capital, and country size, ii) the interaction of trade-related technology diffusion and country size, and of human capital and country size, iii) the interaction between traderelated technology diffusion and human capital, and iv) the interaction between trade-related technology diffusion, human capital and country size. Section 1.1 deals with the impact of trade on technology diffusion and productivity growth, Section 1.2 provides figures on the brain drain for various categories of countries and regions, and Section 1.3 presents the main findings.
Trade-Related Technology Diffusion and Productivity Growth
Until about two decades ago, while trade theory emphasized the importance of trade liberalization, empirical estimates of the gains from trade were found to be disappointingly small.
The development of endogenous growth theory in the 1980s (Romer 1986 , Lucas 1988 ) allowed policy reform to generate large gains by moving the economy to a higher growth path. Grossman and Helpman (1991) expanded the endogenous growth model by applying it to the open economy.
Based on the idea that goods embody technological know-how, they showed that countries can acquire foreign knowledge through trade and increase their growth rate through trade liberalization.
constructed an index of 'foreign R&D', defined as the trade-weighted sum of trading partners' R&D stocks, and found for OECD countries that both domestic and 'foreign R&D' have a large and significant impact on TFP, and that the latter increases with the economy's openness. Coe et al. (1997) examined the impact of North-South trade-related technology diffusion on TFP in the South and obtained similar results. This led to other studies by, inter alia, Engelbrecht (1997) , Falvey et al. (2002), and Lumengo-Neso et al. (2005) , which have tended to confirm Coe and Helpman's (1995) findings. Other studies have extended the approach to the industry level, including Schiff and Wang (2006) who added South-South trade-related technology diffusion to the analysis and found a positive impact on TFP in the South, though a smaller one than that obtained from NorthSouth trade.
Brain Drain
This paper focuses on the impact of the brain drain and whether it is different for small than for large states. Brain drain figures are presented in Table 1 . The figures are based on Docquier and Marfouk (2006) . The table presents skilled and overall emigration rates in 2000, as well as the ratio of the former to the latter (the schooling gap), for 46 small developing states -defined by the UN as states with population below 1.5 million -and for other categories of interest. Skilled workers are defined as those with university education.
Row 1 of Table 1 shows that small developing states experience an extremely high level of brain drain (43.2%). In other words, 3 out of every 7 individuals with university education lives outside their country of origin. This rate is 2.8 times as large as the 15.3% overall migration rate.
The table also shows a brain drain for small (all) high-income states of 23% (3.5%) or a ratio of 6.5 for small versus all states. The same ratio for developing countries is (43.2 / 7.4) or close to 6. In other words, the impact of country size on the brain drain seems robust across a wide range of incomes. Moreover, the brain drain for all developing countries (7.4%) is over twice that of highincome countries (3.5%) and the schooling gap is close to four times as high (4.9% versus 1.3%).
The region with the highest small-state brain drain (74.9%) is the Caribbean (in "Latin America and the Caribbean"), and Table 2 shows that several states' brain drain is well above 80%.
The East Asia and Pacific region (mainly the South Pacific islands) follows, with a brain drain of 50.8%, with several countries over 70% (Table 2) . Sub-Saharan Africa is next with 41.7%, with several countries over 60% (Table 2 ). 
Main Findings and contributions
The contribution of this paper to the open-economy endogenous growth literature is twofold.
First, it offers an empirical analysis of the relationship between trade-related technology diffusion, country size and productivity growth. Second, it examines how the impact on productivity growth of 1 Table 2 also shows countries in Central America (Belize) and the Mediterranean (Malta) with brain drain above 50% and Cyprus with brain drain above 30%. changes in such variables as the level of education, trade-related technology diffusion, and both, is affected by country size. The main findings are: i) Trade-related technology diffusion has a positive impact on productivity growth that is several times larger for small states than for other countries. Consequently, an increase in the degree of openness has a greater impact on productivity growth in small than in large states.
ii) Similarly, education has a positive impact on productivity growth that is several times larger for small than for large states. Hence, the brain drain's negative impact on productivity growth in small states is a multiple of that for other countries.
iii) In terms of interaction effects, the impact of trade-related technology diffusion on productivity growth increases with the level of education, and this increase is also several times larger for small than for large states. Consequently, the brain drain reduces productivity growth both directly as well as through its interaction with trade-related technology diffusion, with a greater reduction for small than for large states.
These findings imply that productivity growth in small states is more sensitive than in large ones to changes in the brain drain, in trade-related technology diffusion, in levels of education, and to the interaction between changes in these variables.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the empirical implementation. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Implementation
Coe and Helpman (1995) set up the empirical framework to estimate the impact on TFP of North-North trade-related technology diffusion. The studies in the trade-related technology diffusion followed that approach with minor modifications. The equation Coe and Helpman use is: , 0 , ; log log log
RD ) is the domestic (foreign) R&D stock, ε is an error term, and subscript c (t) denotes country (year). Coe et al. (1997) use a similar model to explain North-South trade-related technology diffusion. However, due to lack of data for most developing countries, the equations they estimate do not include domestic R&D. They only use the foreign R&D stock f RD , which is referred to in this paper as 'North foreign R&D' and is denoted by 'NRD' in our study. Abstracting from domestic R&D is unlikely to be a major problem because most of the world's R&D is performed in developed countries. We estimate TFP equations as a function of NRD and a human capital variable, namely the average number of years of education for the population aged 25 and above, denoted by YE. We further add a dummy variable for small states, S3, in order to examine whether their impact on TFP growth differs from that of large ones. The number of countries with a population of 1.5 million or less (on average over the period) in our sample of fifty developing countries is too small to be of much relevance. We use instead a population of 3 million or less as our definition of 'small state', with nine countries or 18% of the sample fitting the definition.
In the empirical estimation, we also introduce several interaction terms. Two of them are interactions between each of the two explanatory variables and S3, i.e., NRD*S3 and YE*S3. The other two are interactions between the two explanatory variables both for small and large states, i.e., NRD*YE and NRD*YE*S3. A positive sign for the first two interaction variables would imply that the productivity-growth impact of NRD and YE is larger in small states, and similarly, a positive sign for NRD*YE*S3 would imply that the impact of NRD*YE is larger in small states.
The estimation equation is specified in terms of five-year changes in the log of TFP (DlogTFP), in the log of NRD (DlogNRD) and in YE (DYE), i.e.:
where
indicates country (year) dummies, capturing country-(year-)specific fixed effects.
The equations estimated in Section 4 include equation (3) The log TFP index is calculated as the difference between the logs of value-added and primary factor use, with the inputs weighted by their income shares, i.e.,
, where α is the mean labor share over the available time period.
The labor share is derived as the ratio of the wage bill over value added.
Fixed capital formation used to construct capital stocks, value added, labor and wages, is from the World Bank data set described in Nicita and Olarreaga (2006) , all reported in current US dollars at the 3-digit ISIC codes (Revision 2). Value-added is deflated by the US GDP deflator (1991=100). Fixed capital formation is also deflated by the US GDP deflator (1991=100), and capital stocks are derived from the deflated fixed capital formation series using the perpetual inventory method with a 5% depreciation rate. 3 The TFP index is constructed using the deflated value added, capital stocks, labor and its average income share with the formula provided. Observations for a typical country consist of five five-year periods. With 50 developing countries and no missing observations, that would give a sample size n = 250. However, we have some missing observations (with n = 230) for production and trade data, and the sample is unbalanced.
Empirical Findings
Given that changes in openness, foreign R&D and education are unlikely to have an immediate impact on productivity growth, we specify the estimated equations in terms of five-year changes in the log of TFP, the log of NRD, and in YE., where "D" before the variable indicates a five-year change. In other words, the estimated equations are specified in terms of the growth rate of TFP and NRD, and in terms of the change in YE. We estimate nine equations, all variants of equation (3) above. The results are presented in Table 3 . (6) and (9), while NS φ > 3 N β in equations (5) and (8).
The coefficient Y β of the education variable DYE ranges from .721 to .807, with significance of 1% or 5% in equations (1), (2), (3) (6) to (9), with the ratio Y YS β φ / > 6 in equation (7), > 5 in equation (8), and > 4 in equations (6) and (9).
The coefficient NY β of the interaction effect DlogNRD*DYE ranges from 1.618 to 1.701, with significance level of 5% or 10%, in regressions (3), (5), (7) and (8). Once the variable DlogNRD*DYE*S3 (with coefficient NYS β ) is added to the regression (equation (9) 
The results provided in Table 3 imply that the impact of DlogNRD, DYE and DlogNRD*DYE on DlogTFP in small states is systematically larger than that in large countries.
Equation (9) -which includes all the explanatory variables and is the preferred equation -shows that the impact of DlogNRD is more than 4 times greater in small states than in large countries, and the impact of DYE (DlogNRD*DYE) is more than 5 times greater.
As shown in Table 1 , the share of migrants who are skilled is larger than the share among residents (Docquier and Schiff, 2006) , implying that the brain drain lowers the average level of education YE and reduces productivity growth. Second, since the interaction effect of education and 'foreign R&D' (the diffusion of technology from the North to the South) is positive, it implies that the brain drain reduces the absorption capacity of developing source countries. In other words, the brain drain reduces the impact that the diffusion of technology from the North has on productivity growth, and this reduction is greater for small states than for large ones. In fact, the loss in productivity growth when this interaction effect is taken into account is close to three times as high (193% higher) in small states than in the other countries, rather than 16% higher when the interaction effect is not taken into account.
Third, small states also tend to suffer from significantly higher brain drain rates. Among developing countries, the brain drain in 2000 was 43.2% for small states and 7.4% for all developing countries, with the former close to six times larger than the latter. Thus, the negative impact of the brain drain is larger in small states both because TFP growth is more sensitive to the brain drain and because the brain drain is substantially greater in these states.
R&D-Intensive Industries
The industry-level data were aggregated in two industry groups: R&D-intensive industries and low R&D-intensity industries in order to examine whether there were significant differences between the two. The regressions were estimated by adding a dummy variable for R&D-intensive industries for all countries. The results are shown in the Appendix Table A1 .
The preferred specification is equation (5) i) Productivity growth increases with trade-related technology diffusion, and the increase is substantially larger for small states than for large ones;
ii) Education has a positive impact on productivity growth, and the increase is substantially larger for small states than for large ones;
iii) The share of migrants who are skilled is larger than the share of residents who are skilled, implying that the brain drain has a negative impact on productivity growth; the (absolute value of that) impact is larger for small than for large states;
iv) The impact of the interaction of trade-related technology diffusion and education on productivity growth is positive, and this impact is greater for small than for large states.
Thus, small states have higher levels of productivity growth than large countries, but their productivity growth is more sensitive to changes in the brain drain, to changes in trade-related technology diffusion, and to the interaction between these two changes. Moreover, small states are more open to trade and benefit therefore from higher levels of trade-related technology diffusion. This is another reason why TFP growth in small states would be higher and would be more sensitive to changes in trade-related technology diffusion. It would also make them more vulnerable to the brain drain.
Small states also exhibit much higher levels of brain drain, and therefore greater losses in TFP growth than other countries. Thus, the negative impact of the brain drain is larger in small than in large states both because on TFP growth is more sensitive to the brain drain and because the brain drain I substantially greater in these states. 
